Abstract-This paper analyzes the well-known strategic information transmission (SIT) concept of Crawford and Sobel in information economics, from the lens of information theory. SIT differs from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since it involves different objectives for the encoder and the decoder, which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This leads to a game whose equilibrium solutions are studied here. The problem is modeled as a Stackelberg gameas opposed to the Nash model used in prior work in economics. The transmitter is the leader, and the receiver is the follower. As leader, the transmitter announces an encoding strategy with full commitment, and its distortion measure depends on a private information sequence which is non-causally available -only to the transmitter. Three problem settings are considered, focusing on the quadratic distortion measures and jointly Gaussian source and private information: compression, communication, and the simple equilibrium conditions without any compression or communication. The equilibrium strategies and associated costs are characterized. The analysis is then extended to the receiver side information setting. Finally, several applications of the results within the broader context of decision theory are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, economists Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel introduced the concepts of strategic information transmission (SIT) and cheap talk in their seminal Econometrica paper [2] , as a way of understanding how information is strategically revealed (or not) by agents whose interests are only partially aligned. This theory has had tremendous success in explaining situations ranging from advertising to expert advice sharing, and many extensions of the original SIT model and the broader "principal-agent" class of problems have been extensively studied in the economics literature (see e.g., [3] , [4] ) since. However, despite its name and even superficially obvious connection with information theory (IT), SIT has so far received very little attention from the IT community. We believe that such problems can still significantly benefit from an information theoretic look and endeavor to start doing so in this paper.
More specifically, this work focuses on compression and communication scenarios where the better informed transmitter communicates with a receiver who makes the ultimate decision concerning both agents. In the SIT problem [2] , the transmitter has access to some private bias information, and its utility function depends on the observed source, the private Part of the material in this paper will be presented at the IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Jeju Island, Korea, Oct. 2015 [1] . This work was supported by AFOSR MURI Grant FA9550-10-1-0573.
information and the receiver's action. The receiver has a different utility function (independent of the private information). Both parties, the transmitter and the receiver, try to maximize their individual utility functions. One of the main results of [2] is that, at Nash equilibrium, i.e., when the transmitter and the receiver announce their strategies simultaneously (see e.g., [5] ), all equilibrium points are achieved by quantizers (i.e., a loss inducing deterministic mapping) as transmitter and receiver strategies. This result essentially connects such game theoretic problems to source coding (with mismatched encoder and decoder distortion measures) where quantization is the main mathematical tool.
The question of source compression with mismatched distortion measures has been addressed from many different points of view, see e.g., [6] - [9] , and the references therein. The main difference between this work and all earlier ones in IT is that in the SIT problem, the encoder and the decoder are aware of the mismatched objectives, and they act (design the encoding and the decoding mappings) accordingly. In prior work, this mismatch was considered to be created by nature (worst case, or robust design) [6] , [8] or by an adversarial secondary decoder [9] , but not as an intentional consequence of strategic agents.
SIT type communication problems have very recently gained interest. In [10] , networked estimation with biased sensors is analyzed in the context of Stackelberg equilibrium, limiting the communication strategies to affine models. In [11] , the approach of [2] is extended to noisy and multidimensional settings to analyze the Nash equilibria. In this paper, as opposed to [2] , we consider the problem as a Stackelberg game [5] where the receiver (the follower) is aware of the transmitter (the leader) policy and optimizes its mapping as a function of the encoding mapping. Another fundamental difference is that we consider the private information as a random sequence generated by a memoryless source as opposed to a deterministic constant. These deviations from the well-known SIT setting of [2] enable the use of Shannon theoretic arguments [12] to derive fundamental limits of compression and communication.
As a side note, we note that Stackelberg games with quadratic objectives and Gaussian variables (which will be referred as quadratic-Gaussian or Q-G setting throughout the paper) have been well studied in the control literature, see e.g., [13] , [14] . However, the problems we consider here involve communication and are hence fundamentally different than the ones in control without any communication. Control problems with communication (cf. [15] ), particularly ones with Gaussian channels have been analyzed in non-strategic settings employing the Shannon bounds. However, the Shannon bounds in the strategic settings are unknown and are indeed the main subject of this paper.
The main features of this paper are the following:
• We formulate the problem and derive simple equilibrium conditions (without any compression or noise in the communication). The derivation of the equilibrium conditions, such as proving optimality of affine strategies, poses a significant challenge, since the well-known tools from information theory, such as optimality of linear strategies in Gaussian settings [16] , cannot be used directly due to the strategic aspect of the problem.
• We determine the single-letter characterization of the fundamental limits of strategic compression. We explicitly compute it for the setting of jointly Gaussian source and private information, and quadratic measures.
• We show optimality of single-letter linear strategies in the case of jointly Gaussian source and private information and quadratic distortion measures transmitted over power constrained additive Gaussian channel. This result parallels the well-known optimality of single-letter mappings for the same setting without the strategic aspect of the problem [16] .
• We analyze the impact of the receiver side information on the structure of the results.
• Finally, we demonstrate the use of information theoretic results in strategic decision making/control problems involving the Gaussian test channel.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation R and R + denote the respective sets of real numbers and positive real numbers. Let E(·) denote the expectation operator. The Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ 2 is denoted as N (µ, σ 2 ). All logarithms in the paper are natural logarithms and may in general be complex valued, and the integrals are, in general, Lebesgue integrals. S denotes the set of Borel measurable, square integrable functions {f : R → R}. We use standard information theoretic and game theoretic notations for the related results throughout this paper (cf. [5] , [17] ).
B. An Overview of the SIT Model
In the original SIT model [2] , there are two players: a transmitter and a receiver. The state information or type, X, is drawn from a population with density f (·), supported on [0, 1]. X is available only to the transmitter. The receiver, based on the transmitter output, takes action a ∈ R. The utility functions of the transmitter and the receiver are respectively U T (x, a, b) and U R (x, a), where b is a deterministic bias parameter that measures the differences in the preferences of the agents. All aspects of the game, except the realization of X, are common knowledge.
There are a few technical conditions that the utility functions U T (x, a, b) and U R (x, a) must satisfy:
• they are twice continuously differentiable
, which correspond to the common communication setting where the decoder estimates X with minimum mean squared error (MSE) and the encoder wants the estimate to be as close to X + b as possible in the MSE sense, satisfy these technical conditions.
The game is described as follows: the transmitter observes the source X and transmits a message y ∈ Y, where Y is any infinite set. The receiver observes y and chooses an action a which determines the pay-offs. A pure strategy 
where Y = g * (X). There may exist multiple Nash equilibria corresponding to different costs, see e.g., [18] on selecting the best equilibrium among these. An interesting aspect is that there is no cost associated with the message y, which is why this setting has also been referred to as "cheap talk" [3] , [4] . There has been a recent interest in incorporating communication cost within the SIT framework, see e.g., [19] .
This mathematical problem formulation corresponds to many practical settings. For example, consider a "decision maker" (receiver), e.g., a senator, asking the opinion of a biased "expert" (transmitter), e.g., a climate scientist, to make a decision, e.g. to decide on an environmental bill. Note that the objective of these agents -who do not trust each otherdiffer and the decision made by the receiver affects both. Then, what can be said about the structure encoding-decoding mappings at an equilibrium? The main result of [2] answers this question as the following:
This result has several interesting aspects. First, in contrast with the classical communication setting, where quantization is imposed by rate constraint or channel noise, here quantization occurs solely because of the mismatch between agents? objectives. Second, this structural result holds for any arbitrary source 2 , even for the Q-G setting. Third, a frequently exploited result in estimation and control theory states optimality of linear strategies for Q-G setting, see e.g., the Kalman filter [20] ; hence it is surprising to see that this optimality breaks down in a strategic setting.
The two main aspects that differentiate the SIT notion of communication from the conventional communication setting in information theory [12] (beyond the obvious difference that the Shannon bounds operate at asymptotically high blocklengths and SIT setting involves single-letter mappings) are: 1) Shannon bounds assume the objectives of the encoder and the decoder are identical (e.g., both agents try to minimize expected distortion, or probability of error). The main feature of the SIT setting is the mismatch between these two objectives, i.e., agents are strategic. 2) Since the objectives are aligned, the agents know each others' mappings and optimize their mappings accordingly (e.g., they share a codebook). In the SIT setting, agents are not committed to any mapping a priori, i.e., they announce the mappings simultaneously, hence for example the decoder cannot learn the encoding mapping and optimize its own mapping accordingly. This aspect is a consequence of Nash equilibrium. In our analysis, we consider a Stackelberg game as opposed to Nash equilibria considered in [2] , where the transmitter is the leader and the receiver is the follower. The game proceeds as follows: the transmitter plays first and announces an encoding mapping. As opposed to the game in [2] , the transmitter is committed to its encoding mapping, i.e., the transmitter cannot change it after the receiver plays. The receiver, knowing this commitment, determines its own mapping that maximizes its pay-off, given the encoding mapping. The transmitter, of course, will anticipate this, and pick its mapping accordingly.
C. Setting-1: Simple (Noiseless) Equilibrium
We consider the general communication system whose block diagram is shown in Figure 1 . The source X and private information θ are mapped into U ∈ R which is fully determined by the conditional distribution p(·|x, θ). For the sake of brevity, and with a slight abuse of notation, we refer to this as a stochastic mapping U = g(X, θ) so that
holds almost everywhere in X and θ. Let the set of all such mappings be denoted by Γ (which has a one-to-one correspondence to the set of all the conditional distributions that construct the transmitter output U ).
In the most general communication setting (see Sections II-F and III-C), we consider an additive noise channel as shown in Figure 1 , with Gaussian noise N ∼ N (0, σ 2 N ), hence the input to the receiver is Y = U + N . Here, however we focus on the simpler problem where there is no channel noise, i.e., we effectively assume σ 2 N = 0, and hence Y = U (almost everywhere). The receiver produces an estimate of the sourcê X through a mapping h ∈ S asX = h(Y ). The objective of the receiver is to minimize
while that of the transmitter is to minimize
over the mappings g(·, ·) ∈ Γ, h(·) ∈ S. In game theoretic terms, we consider a Stackelberg game, where the transmitter (the leader) knows that the decoder (the follower) acts to minimize its own measure in (3) as a function of encoding mapping g(·, ·). From the transmitter's point of view, we areX
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looking for an encoding mapping, g(·, ·), that minimizes a distortion measured by d E , with a decoder h(·) matched to the distortion measure d D . In the following, we present this optimization problem formally:
Quadratic-Gaussian Setting: Most of our results concern the setting where the source and the private information are jointly Gaussian i.e., (X, θ) ∼ N (0, R Xθ ) where, without any loss of generality, R Xθ is parametrized as
, and the distortion measures are given as follows:
Hence, we have the following cost functions:
Our main result, regarding this equilibrium, is that, in sharp contrast with the original SIT which considers the Nash equilibria, the Stackelberg equilibrium for quadratic-Gaussian setting admits linear optimal encoding-decoding strategies (see Theorem 4) . At first glance, this result might seem trivial given the well-known optimality of linear strategies in quadraticGaussian systems. However, proving this property in this strategic context poses a significant challenge that requires two tools from information theory. In the following, we present an overview of these auxiliary results.
D. Information Theoretic Tools 1) Functional Representation Lemma: Like many ideas in information theory, the functional representation lemma has its seeds in Shannon's pioneering work [21] . Since then, different variations of this lemma have been used in several problems in information theory, see e.g., [22] - [24] . The following form, with its proof, can be found in [25, page 626] . Essentially, this lemma states that one can replace the random variable W with a deterministic function γ(·, ·) and
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another random variable Z that is independent of Y . The functional representation lemma is derived for discrete random variables, and a major component of it concerns cardinality bounds. Here, we operate in the continuous domain, and the proof of the lemma can be extended to continuous settings, without the cardinality bounds.
2) Maximal Correlation Coefficient: The maximal correlation coefficient between two random variables X and Y , introduced in [26] , [27] and studied in [28] is
where supremum is taken over all (Borel) measurable functions f, g with
Explicit expressions for f m (X, Y ) are available only in a few cases, and numerical algorithms have been devised to estimate f m in [29] . The following is a well-known result, see e.g., [30] for proof.
Lemma 2. For jointly Gaussian random variables ξ 1 and ξ 2 with classical (Pearson) correlation coefficient corr, we have
Due to Lemma 2 and the tensorization 3 property (shown in [31] ), maximal correlation has played significant role in several problems in information theory, see e.g., [32] - [35] .
E. Setting-2: Strategic Compression
Let us first present an overview of the basic (non-strategic) results in source compression. Assume a memoryless source and a single-letter, bounded, and additive distortion measure
A block code pair (f E , f D ) consists of an encoding function f E : X n −→ M which maps the source to index set M, and a decoding function f D : M −→ Y n . A rate-distortion pair (R, D) is called achievable if for every δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a block code (f E , f D ) such that
The fundamental result in information theory [17] is that the rate-distortion (R-D) function indicating the minimum achievable rate R for prescribed distortion D, denoted as R(D) is given by minimizing the mutual information I(X; Y ) over all conditional distributions P Y |X (y|x) that maintain the prescribed distortion:
Now, we define the strategic compression problem similar to its non-strategic counterpart where a memoryless source X n and the private information sequence θ n are mapped to an index set M by f E :
for every δ > 0 and sufficiently large n. The set of achievable
achieved by the mappings that satisfy:
F. Setting-3: Gaussian Test Channel and Noisy Equilibrium
Consider the general communication system whose block diagram is shown in Figure 2 , the source X ∼ N (0, σ 2 X ) is to be transmitted to the receiver via g ∈ S as U = g(X) over an additive Gaussian channel; hence the input to the receiver is Y = U + N , where N ∼ N (0, σ 2 N ) is statistically independent of X. The receiver produces its outputX through an h ∈ S asX = h(Y ). The objective of both agents is to minimize E(X −X) 2 , while the transmitter has an average power constraint E{U 2 i } ≤ P T . Although this problem is formulated in single-letter (zerodelay) setting, the solution is obtained by expanding the feasible solution space to n-letter (asymptotically high delay) strategies, i.e., by solving the information theoretic version of the problem. Obviously allowing more delay, the information theoretic solution should at least perform as well as the zerodelay one. The following well-known result of Goblick [16] states that these solutions are identical.
Theorem 2 ( [16]).
For the Gaussian test channel problem, single-letter mappings
are the essentially unique 4 , Shannon sense optimal encoding/decoding mappings. Remark 1. This optimality breaks down in the presence of receiver side information (a situation which will be referred as SI throughout the paper), shown as W in Figure 2 , and linear strategies are no longer optimal even in the zero-delay case (see e.g., [36] ). As we will analyze in Section IV, the strategic aspect brings up cases where an optimality result, similar to the one in Theorem 2 holds in the strategic SI setting, depending on the problem parameters.
In Section III-C, we investigate whether such a result holds also for the strategic variant of the same problem depicted in Figure 1 . We refer to this setting as the "noisy equilibrium" (see Section III-C) since this is essentially a noisy version of the problem described in Section II-C. In the following, we formalize this problem.
where Y = g(X, θ) + N , and d E and d D are given in (5).
G. Decision Making Problems
The optimality of linear strategies plays a central role in many problems control and economics, particularly in team decision theory. While the solutions to linear, quadratic and Gaussian (LQG) team problems with classical information structure are well-known to be linear-when the information structure is non-classical, such problems may or may not admit linear (or affine) optimal solution (cf. [15] ). The celebrated 1968 counterexample of Witsenhausen whose optimal solution is not affine, belongs to this family of problems [37] . Another example is the Gaussian test channel, which however admits a linear optimal solution (see Section II-F). In the following, we present a generic setting associated with these problems.
Consider the communication setting depicted in Figure 2 (without SI). All variables are Gaussian and the agents operate through the mappings g, h ∈ S. The common objective of both agents is minimization of J = E{ϕ(X, U,X)}: an expectation of a function ϕ (in the form of a second-order polynomial) of X, U andX, over the mappings g, h, where expectation is over all random quantities involved. The Gaussian test channel, which admits a linear optimal solutions, corresponds to ϕ = (X −X)
with k 1 > 0 (see Theorem 2). The counterexample of Witsenhausen, which corresponds to
with k 1 > 0, still admits an optimal solution but it is not linear [37] . In [38] , these two results have been generalized to obtain the conditions on ϕ which guarantee that the problem admits a linear (or affine) optimal solution. Here, we reproduce this result with a sketch of the proof.
Theorem 3 ( [38]
). The problem admits a linear optimal solution, if and only if ϕ does not involve any UX term.
Proof. Simple eliminations show that this problem and another problem with ϕ are equivalent, where ϕ = (X − X)
} is minimized by a linear solution due to Theorem 2 since E{ϕ } corresponds to the Lagrangian cost of the constrained problem described in Section II-F. By CauchySchwarz inequality, E{XU } is maximized (or minimized) by a linear solution, under the constraint that E{U 2 } ≤ P T . Depending on the sign of k 2 , the first agent picks the sign of c in the linear solution g(X) = cX, and hence a linear solution minimizes the entire cost function E{ϕ }. To show the "only if " part, a nonlinear mapping that outperform any linear one was derived in [38] .
In Section V, we extend this result, which can be viewed as a generalization of the Gaussian test channel, to strategic settings. The problem statement is essentially identical to Problem 3 in noisy equilibrium, except that we replace the functions in (5) with second-order polynomials of X, θ, U,X denoted here as ϕ E and ϕ D . More formally, we have Problem 4. Find g * (·, ·) ∈ Γ and h * (·) ∈ S that satisfy
where Y = g(X, θ) + N , and ϕ E and ϕ D are second order polynomials of X, θ, U,X.
III. MAIN RESULTS

A. Equilibrium Conditions
We first characterize the noiseless Q-G equilibrium.
Theorem 4.
In the noiseless Q-G setting, the unique equilibrium is achieved by g(X, θ) = X +αθ and h(Y ) = κY where α and κ are constants given as:
Costs at the equilibrium are
where A = 1 + 4(r + ρ).
Proof. The optimal decoding mapping is h(Y ) = E{X|Y } regardless of the choice of encoder's policy g. Hence, the problem simplifies to an optimization over the encoding mapping g. Consider the dual (equivalent) problem of minimizing D E subject to a fixed D D . Expanding D E , we have
Noting that the first term is D D , and the last term is E{θ 2 } (constant with respect to the optimization variables), the problem simplifies to minimizing E{θΓ} over the joint distribution of θ, Γ (with fixed marginal for θ), subject to
and Γ is defined as Γ X − E{X|Y }. Next, let us define Γ G as the Gaussian reconstruction error that satisfies the constraints in (16), i.e., the encoder generates Y = X +αθ+T , where α is a constant and T ∼ N (0, σ 2 T ) is Gaussian, independent, of θ and X, and the decoder uses the optimal estimator which is linear and hence yields jointly Gaussian reconstructionX and reconstruction error X −X = Γ G . Using Lemma 1, we represent two random variables Γ, Γ G as
where η : R × R → R is a deterministic function and Z is a random variable distributed independently from Γ G , and Z − (Γ G , Γ) − θ forms a Markov chain in this order. Hence, the objective can be expressed as: minimize
over η(·, ·) and the joint distribution of Z and θ which is denoted here as f Z,θ (z, θ). Next, we expand J = min η(·,·),f Z,θ J:
where η z : R → R is a deterministic function that depends on the realization Z = z, (21) is due to Fatou's lemma (cf. [39] ), and (22) is a consequence of the Markov chain Z−(Γ, Γ G )−θ, and independence of Z and Γ G . Note that
hold due to (16) . We can equivalently consider an instance of Z = z, where we have E{η z (Γ G )} = 0 and E{η 2 z (Γ G )} is fixed. Noting that θ and Γ G are jointly Gaussian, we invoke Lemma 2 to conclude that Γ = Γ G minimizes (18) . Hence, without loss of generality, we assume Y = X + αθ + T where T ∼ N(0, σ 2 T ) is independent of X and θ. Next, we find the value of α and σ 2 T at equilibrium. We first expand D E as
Note that the last term in (25) vanishes due to orthogonality of the MSE error to the reconstructionX. The first term in (25) is constant with respect to the optimization variables (σ 2 T and α) hence the objective can be re-expressed as maximizing E{(2θ + X)X}, and by replacing the expression forX as: maximize
over α and σ 
Noting that
dα 2 < 0 for α < 0, the global maximizer of J is either at the boundary or the one in (13) . Noting lim α→−∞ J(α, 0) < J(α * , 0) we obtain (13). Plugging (13) into (6), and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain (14) and (15).
Remark 2. Note that unlike the Nash equilibria in the original SIT work [2] , the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique.
Remark 3. In [10] , where a similar quadratic equilibrium is studied, the transmission and the receiver strategies have been constrained to be affine. Theorem 4 proves that the optimal strategy is indeed affine (linear) for this setting. Our approach, that is using maximal correlation in conjunction with the functional representation lemma to show Gaussianity of reconstruction error, can potentially offer solutions to other problems involving the Gaussian test channel. We leave exploration of that as a future study.
Remark 4. An interesting aspect of the equilibrium is that α < 1 for all problem parameters. This implies that although the transmitter wants the receiver to reconstruct X + θ as its estimate, it does not directly transmit X + θ. A high level interpretation of this observation, is that at equilibrium, the transmitter never flat out lies.
We next focus on the impact of r on D D . We plot the costs as a function of r for ρ = 0 in Figure 3a . The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem 4. The effect of correlation ρ on D E and D D is illustrated in Figure 3b . As can be seen in Figure 3b , D D is an increasing function of ρ while D E is decreasing in ρ, as intuitively expected: if ρ = −1, the objective of the transmitter is to makeX = 0 (for r = 1), which can be achieved by transmitting nothing. This equilibrium is referred as the "babbling equilibrium" in cheap talk literature [3] . As ρ increases, D E increases as well and the transmitted message becomes more informative for the receiver. At the extremal point of ρ = 1, the receiver can reconstruct X perfectly.
B. Compression
We characterize RD S for general sources and distortion measures.
Theorem 5. RD S is the convex hull of the set of all triplets (R, D E , D D ) for which there exist a function h : R → R and a conditional distribution p(Y |X, θ) such that The proof of Theorem 5 directly follows from the standard rate-distortion arguments and is omitted here (see e.g., [17] ).
Next, we specialize to the quadratic-Gaussian case.
Lemma 3. All equilibrium points of RD S are achieved, uniquely, by the jointly Gaussian (X, Y, θ) triplet.
The proof follows from the well-known property of Gaussian distribution achieving maximum entropy under a variance constraint and the proof of Theorem 4. The following theorem characterizes the strategic R-D function for the quadraticGaussian equilibrium.
Theorem 6. For the quadratic-Gaussian setting, the equilibrium (D E , D D ) pair in terms of R is:
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have Y = X + βθ + S for some β ∈ R where S ∼ N (0, σ 2 S ) is independent of X and θ. Plugging this representation in Theorem 5, we obtain the following characterization of R,
Using (31), we have
We next note that the objective of the encoder is to minimize D E over the possible choices of β, which is equivalent to maximizing
which is the same expression as (26) with β replacing α, and with σ 
Plugging (34) into (32) and (33) , and using (36), we obtain (29) and (30).
The strategic R-D functions, for fixed ρ = 0, and r = 1 or r = 0.1, are plotted in Figure 3c .
C. Noisy Equilibrium
Here, we analyze the noisy Q-G equilibrium (described in Section II-F), where we investigate whether the singleletter strategies similar to ones in Theorem 2 continue to have Shannon sense optimality at the noisy equilibrium.
Theorem 7. For the noisy Q-G equilibrium, the strategies
are Shannon sense optimal for all power levels.
Remark 5. If a single-letter strategy is Shannon sense optimal, it is also optimal among all single-letter strategies.
Proof. From standard estimation theoretic principles, we obtain that D E associated with the mappings in (37) and an additive Gaussian noise channel with variance σ 2 N is:
(1 + αρ)(1 + 2αr + αρ + 2ρ)
Using data processing inequality [17] , by setting
one obtains a lower bound on the distortion of any sourcechannel coding scheme [12, Theorem 21] . The capacity of the AWGN channel is given by
Plugging (30) and (39) into (38), we obtain D = D E .
Remark 6. A simple proof of Theorem 7 follows from application of the probabilistic matching conditions, particularly see [40, Lemma 2] . The conditional probability 5 p(Y |X, θ), derived in the proof of Theorem 6 as Y = X + βθ + S, is identical to the actual communication channel considered in this section (also note that α in Theorem 7 is identical to β in the proof of Theorem 6). It has been well known that such a probabilistic matching is necessary and sufficient for Shannon-sense optimality of a single letter code. This observation, although following from basic principles, makes the verification of Shannon sense optimality of a single-letter code feasible in settings for which the derivations of ratedistortion and capacity are rather involved (see Theorem 9) .
IV. IMPACT OF RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION
Next, we extend our analysis to decoder side information setting as shown in Figure 1 , where X, θ, W is jointly Gaussian. The realization of W is not available at the transmitter, however, joint statistics is common knowledge. This setting is well studied in information theory [41] , [42] . It is practically relevant as a first step towards extending analysis to network settings, as well as a model of decision-making in the presence of multiple experts, as discussed in the example in Section II-B. We first focus on the noiseless equilibrium, and then extend our analysis to the compression and the noisy equilibrium settings.
Remark 7.
When the realization of the SI, W , is available both at the transmitter and the receiver, problem simplifies to one without any SI, analyzed in Section III. Intuitively, the reasons is that the transmitter can operate on (X − E{X|W }, θ − E{θ|W }) as the effective (X, θ) pair and due to jointly Gaussian statistics, (X − E{X|W }, θ − {θ|W }) is statistically independent of W . Since the receiver has also access to W , all main results of Section III hold.
The following lemma states that mappings at the equilibrium are linear (affine if variables have non-zero mean).
Lemma 4. The noiseless Q-G equilibrium is achieved by mappings
for some α, b, c ∈ R.
The proof follows identical steps to those of Theorem 4, and hence is omitted here. The coefficients, α, b, c at 5 Also referred as the forward test channel [17] . this equilibrium can be explicitly computed also similar to Theorem 4, but this computation is rather involved and not included here. Instead, we focus on the high level impact of SI. We then analyze strategic compression in the presence of the receiver SI. The following theorem, whose proof directly follows from standard arguments, states the achievable R-D region. 
In general, in non-strategic information theoretic settings, side information has two types of benefits for the receiver, demonstrated in Theorem 8 (for a detailed analysis, see [25, Section 11] and [43] ). The first one is estimation benefit, which corresponds to the receiver using W (in addition to Y ) to generateX, as shown in (42) and (43) . This benefit also exists in the single-letter case. The second one, namely the rate reduction benefit only exists in the information theoretic setting, and is demonstrated by the term I(Y ; W ) in (41) . In non-strategic settings, the encoder makes Y correlated with W to maximize this rate reduction. However, in strategic settings, there exist problem parameters that render Y independent of W due to differences in d E and d D , hence make I(Y ; W ) vanish. This observation plays a pivotal role in the noisy equilibrium with SI setting. The proof of Gaussianity of Y and the dependence of σ 2 S on rate follows from Lemma 4 and the entropy maximization property of Gaussian density [44] . Dependence of β on the rate is due to the I(Y ; W ) term in (41).
Remark 8. In Theorem 6, the compression coefficient β is independent of the allowed rate, and identical to the equilibrium coefficient α in Theorems 4 and 7. Here, due to SI, particularly, the I(Y ; W ) term, β depends on rate, and is obviously different from α in Lemma 4 where there is no rate constraint.
Finally, we employ a probabilistic matching idea to deduce conditions for optimality of linear strategies in noisy equilibrium setting depicted in Figure 1 .
Theorem 9. In strategic, noisy Q-G setting with SI, singleletter linear strategies
are Shannon sense optimal if and only if
where α satisfies the equilibrium in Theorem 4, ρ W,θ = E{W θ} and ρ W,X = E{W X} are source statistics parameters and
is the capacity of the channel.
Remark 9. Theorem 9 does not preclude the possibility of optimality of the mappings in (44) within the set of singleletter strategies even if they do not satisfy (45) in which case they are strictly suboptimal in Shannon sense (i.e., among nletter strategies).
Proof. Probabilistic matching requires, for Shannon sense optimality, the communication channel in Figure 1 to be identical to the R-D test channel. From standard estimation theoretic principles, we obtain that the linear mappings that yield a noisy equilibrium are in the form of (44) . Note that α does not depend on the channel parameters P T or σ 2 N . However, β(R) depends on the rate, and hence on the channel parameters, due to (46). Only way to make the R-D test channel identical to the actual one is to operate at the rate point where β(R) = α. From Theorem 8, β(R) = α implies that I(Y ; W ) = 0 which is equivalent to statistical independence of Y and W . Since all variables are jointly Gaussian with zero mean, the statistical independence implies uncorrelated variables, hence we have (45) .
V. DECISION MAKING PROBLEMS
In this section, we focus on the equilibrium described in Problem 4. The following theorem characterizes this equilibrium and hence extends the main result of [38] to the strategic setting.
Theorem 10. The linear mappings g(X) = c(X + αθ) and h(Y ) = dY for some c, d ∈ R are the essentially unique mappings at the equilibrium, if and only if ϕ E and ϕ D do not involve any cross terms UX.
Remark 10. Before delving into the proof, we note that the proof does not directly follow from Theorem 7. The reason is that the cross term in the objective functions, E{U (a 1 X + a 2 θ)}, for some a 1 , a 2 ∈ R, cannot be upper bounded using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (as done in [38] for the term E{XU }) since a linear mapping for g(X, θ) does not necessarily imply g(X, θ) = κ(a 1 X + a 2 θ) for some κ ∈ R. Hence, in the proof, we address the problem from the beginning.
Proof. First, we follow very similar steps to ones in [38] to show that the problem is equivalent to the one with
as the objective functions in the underlying stochastic game. The optimal mapping for the second agent is h(Y ) = E{X|Y } regardless of the choice of encoder's policy g. Hence, the problem simplifies to optimization over the encoding mapping g. Consider the dual (equivalent) problem of minimizing J E = E{ϕ E } subject to a fixed J D = E{ϕ D }. Let us expand
where D E = E{(X − E{X|Y }) 2 } + 2E{θ(X − E{X|Y })} + E{θ 2 }.
We follow the same steps as those in the proof of Theorem 4 to conclude that jointly Gaussian Y, X, θ minimizes D E for any given, fixed J D . Let us now consider the original problem of minimizing J E . For any given J D , D E , the problem simplifies to minimization of E{k 1 U 2 + k 2 U X + k 3 U θ} subject to fixed D E . Here, E{k 1 U 2 } corresponds to a power constraint of the form E{U 2 } = P T for some P T ∈ R + , hence the problem can be transformed into minimization problem with hard constraints: minimize E{U (X + k3 k2 θ)} subject to fixed D E and E{U 2 } = P T . The power constraint ensures that the optimal U is zero-mean. Noting that (X + k3 k2 θ) is Gaussian, and first and second order moments of U are fixed (power constraint fixes E{U 2 }), the same steps that led to joint Gaussianity of X, Y, θ for fixed J D in the preceding part of the proof, also yield joint Gaussianity of X, θ and U (and thus Y ). Hence, for any J D and D E constraint, we can find a jointly Gaussian U, X, θ that minimizes the cross terms which are products of a fixed Gaussian random variable and an optimization variable. The only mapping that yields jointly Gaussian U, X, θ is linear (or affine if the underlying variables are not zero-mean). The "only if" part follows from the observation that, an optimal linear strategy implies the optimality of a linear strategy in the non-strategic setting, by casting X + kθ as the effective X for some k ∈ R. This contradicts the "only if" part of Theorem 3.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have addressed some fundamental communication problems in the context of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the strategic information transmission (SIT) problem. Tools from information theory have played a key role in derivation of our results as:
• The Q-G equilibrium admits unique linear optimal (or affine for non-zero mean variables) strategies. The proof is nontrivial and requires results from probability theory, namely functional representation lemma and maximal correlation measure which have been extensively used in information theory.
• The noisy Q-G equilibrium also admits linear optimal strategies. The proof relies on the fundamental concepts of information theory: data processing inequality, and the notions of rate-distortion and channel capacity [12] .
• The Q-G equilibrium with receiver SI admits linear optimal strategies, if there is no channel noise present. Otherwise, i.e., for the noisy equilibrium, it does so for the very specific, matched case of the channel noise, the allowed power and the joint statistics of source-private information-side information. The key idea in the proof, beside the seminal ideas on source compression with SI [42] , [25] is the probabilistic matching for Shannon sense optimality of a single-letter code [7] , [40] .
